STANDARDS OF MATERIALITY GOVERNING
THE PROSECUTORIAL DUTY TO DISCLOSE
EVIDENCE TO THE DEFENSE
EMILY D. QuiN,*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States and Alaska Constitutions guarantee criminal
defendants the right to a fair trial as an essential element of due process of law.1 Courts have interpreted the fair trial requirement to impose a duty on prosecutors to disclose to defendants material evidence

within the prosecutors' possession or control.2 This note addresses the
United States Supreme Court and Alaska Court of Appeals decisions
regarding the prosecutors' duty to disclose evidence, focusing on how
prosecutors determine what, if any, evidence they must disclose to the

defense. 3 Prosecutors must measure the evidence against the appropriate standard of materiality and then disclose accordingly. 4 This
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1. U.S. CONST. amend. V; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 7.
2. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (plurality opinion)
(duty to disclose under United States Constitution); Maloney v. State, 667 P.2d 1258
(Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (duty to disclose under Alaska Constitution).
3. Commentators have suggested that the United States Supreme Court adopt a
total disclosure rule, thereby avoiding some of the problems with materiality standards, prosecutorial bad faith, and prosecutorial discretion. See, eg., Beatty, The
Ability to Suppress Exculpatory Evidence: Let's Cut Off the Prosecutor'sHands, 17
IDAHO L. REv. 237, 238-39 (1981); Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose, 40 U. CHI. L. RiEv. 112, 135-40 (1972). This development is
very unlikely because the Court has rejected the total disclosure option at least four
times as not required by due process. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675
(1985); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488 n.8 (1984); United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97, 109 (1976); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795 (1972). Lower courts are
almost uniformly hostile to the proposition. See Note, The Prosecutor'sDuty to Disclose After United States v. Agurs, 1977 U. ILL. L. F. 690, 718.
4. Materiality standards are used at two different phases of litigation. First,
prosecutors use them to determine what evidence to disclose to defendants voluntarily. Second, trial and appellate courts use materiality standards to decide claims of
prosecutorial due process violations. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107-08
(1976).
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note discusses the standards of materiality as they relate to both voluntary disclosure and disclosure in response to requests by defense
counsel.
The discussion will trace the development of the federal materiality standard in United States Supreme Court decisions, the Alaska
Court of Appeals' interpretation of the federal standard, and the development of the standard of materiality under the Alaska Constitution. The Alaska Court of Appeals interpreted United States Supreme
Court decisions to apply a materiality standard more favorable to defendants when they make specific, timely requests for evidence.5 The
same court interpreted the Alaska Constitution as also permitting a
more lenient standard for specific requests that are untimely, yet justifiably so. 6 The Supreme Court has since collapsed the distinction between specific requests and general/no requests, 7 and announced a
new standard of materiality applicable to all disclosure questions. It
remains to be seen whether Alaska courts will follow the Supreme
Court or retain the distinction between specific and non-specific requests under the Alaska Constitution. The discussion concludes with
an analysis of the appropriate standard in light of the Alaska Court of
Appeals' concerns stated in the cases.
The United States Supreme Court first explicitly recognized the
duty to disclose material evidence in 1963 in Brady v. Maryland;8 however, the Court did not define materiality. In 1976 the Court again
addressed the duty in United States v. Agurs, 9 and found that the duty
recognized in Brady applied to three situations: when prosecutors offer perjured testimony, when prosecutors fail to disclose material evidence despite a specific request from defendants, and when
prosecutors fail to disclose material evidence to defendants who have
made a general request or no request at all. 10 Agurs defined materiality for cases of perjury and general/no requests, but arguably not for
specific requests. 1 In perjury cases, evidence is material if there is a
"reasonable likelihood" that the undisclosed evidence would have affected the verdict. 12 In general/no request cases, however, a narrower
definition of materiality is applied: the appropriate inquiry is whether
the undisclosed evidence would have created a "reasonable doubt"
that did not otherwise exist as to defendant's guilt.13
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Maloney v. State, 667 P.2d 1258 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
Id.
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
427 U.S. 97 (1976).
Id. at 103-07.
Id. at 103-12. See also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 681 & n.12.
Agur,; 427 U.S. at 103.
Id. at 112-13.
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Until 1984, the Supreme Court had never addressed the issue of
whether prosecutors have a constitutional duty to gather and preserve
evidence and what standard of materiality would govern this situation.
Since 1976, the Alaska courts have imposed on prosecutors a duty to
gather and preserve evidence, judging materiality by the same standard as in a case of failure to disclose evidence.1 4 In 1984, the United
States Supreme Court held that constitutional due process obligates
prosecutors to gather and preserve certain evidence. 15 The Supreme
Court also held, however, that the same materiality standard for failure to disclose did not apply in cases where prosecutors had failed to
gather or preserve evidence. 16 The Alaska cases that will be discussed
involve a duty to gather and preserve evidence, but since Alaska treats
the two situations as equivalent, this note analyzes the cases to determine the materiality standard for the duty to disclose.
17
In 1983, the Alaska Court of Appeals held in Maloney v. State
that Agurs had set the proper standard of materiality under the United
States Constitution for specific requests as the reasonable likelihood
standard applied in perjury cases. 18 The court also treated the question of materiality standards for general/no requests under the Alaska
Constitution and declared itself in accord with the Agurs application
of the stricter reasonable doubt standard for certain cases. 19
Maloney, however, had interpreted the Agurs holding regarding
specific requests in a manner inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
later holding in United States v. Bagley. In Bagley, the Court held that
the new "reasonable probability" standard applied to both specific and
general/no requests. 20 The Alaska Court of Appeals has determined
that the reasonable probability standard would fall toward the lenient
side of the spectrum of materiality standards, as would harmless error.2 1 The court applied the reasonable probability standard to a specific request in a due process claim under the Alaska Constitution. It
is uncertain whether the Alaska courts will also apply the reasonable
probability standard to general/no requests, or whether the timeliness
14. Lauderdale v. State, 548 P.2d 376 (Alaska 1976). See infra note 99.
15. California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984); see also Arizona v. Youngblood,
- U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 333 (1988). In Youngblood, the Court shifted its focus from the
evidence to whether the police acted in bad faith.
16. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488. Instead, the court stated that the "duty must be
limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's
defense." Id.
17. 667 P.2d 1258 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
18. Id. at 1264-65.
19. Id. at 1265 & n.7.
20. 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
21. St. John v. State, 715 P.2d 1205, 1212 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
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and specificity of requests will continue to be relevant factors in choos-

ing among materiality standards under the Alaska Constitution. Two

considerations may prove relevant to these issues. First, the Maloney

court perceived the reasonable doubt standard as very difficult for defendants to meet. Second, by treating late requests less favorably than

timely requests, the courts may discourage defendants from making
untimely requests.
II.
A.

THE PROSECUTORIAL DUTY TO DISCLOSE EVIDENCE UNDER
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Brady v. Maryland: Recognizing the Duty to Disclose
Evidence

In Brady v. Maryland,22 the United States Supreme Court first
recognized that prosecutors have an affirmative constitutional duty to
disclose to criminal defendants upon request any favorable evidence
which is material to guilt or punishment. 23 In that case, defendant
Brady's attorney requested before trial all statements made by Brady's
co-defendant, Boblit, who was being tried separately for the same murder.2 4 In one of his statements, Boblit had admitted to strangling the
victim, but he denied this action at trial and in his other statements. 25
The prosecutor withheld the statement in which Boblit confessed from
Brady's attorney, although he disclosed Boblit's other statements. 26
22. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
23. Id. at 87. "The prosecutor's constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence was derived from a previously established constitutional obligation of the prosecutor to correct false testimony. Although the two obligations are arguably distinct,
the Supreme Court has treated them as based on similar principles and governed by
analogous standards." W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.5(a), at
753 (1985).
The following cases discuss the prosecutor's obligations concerning false testimony. In each case, the defendant's due process rights were found to have been violated: Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31-32 (1957) (prosecutor knowingly permitted
false testimony); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 215-16 (1942) (prosecutor coerced
witnesses to perjure themselves or refrain from testifying, knowingly presented perjured testimony of witnesses, and suppressed evidence favorable to defendant);
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (per curiam) (prosecutor knowingly
presented perjured testimony in a criminal trial). The Court later expanded this holding to include the situation in which the testimony concerns only the credibility of a
witness. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-70 (1959).
Subsequent to Brady, the Court held that the Brady rule bound all members of
the prosecutor's office who were aware that the witness' testimony was false. Giglio v.
United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972).
24. Brady, 373 U.S. at 84. For a more detailed statement of the facts of the case
than that given by the Supreme Court, see Babcock, FairPlay: Evidence Favorableto
an Accused and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. P v. 1133, 1142 (1982).
25. Babcock, supra note 24, at 1142.
26. Brady, 373 U.S. at 84.
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The undisclosed statement had obvious exculpatory value to Brady,
who first learned of it after he was sentenced to death for first-degree
murder. 27 The trial court denied Brady's motion for a new trial based
on the prosecutor's suppression of Boblit's statement. 28 Nevertheless,
the Maryland Court of Appeals held that the state had denied Brady
due process of law when the prosecutor suppressed Boblit's statement. 29 The court remanded the case for retrial as to punishment, but
30
not as to guilt.

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue

of whether the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution required that Brady be granted a new trial
on the issue of guilt. 31 The Court held that the prosecutor's suppression of Boblit's confession violated due process, 32 but that a new trial
on the issue of punishment was all that due process required. The
Court held that "suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable

to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
materialeither to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith

or bad faith of the prosecution. '33 This holding has become known as
"the Brady rule."'34 A new trial on the merits was not required because the court of appeals had found that nothing in Boblit's confession indicated that the prosecution had failed to prove all the elements
27. Id.
28. Brady appealed this decision to the state court of appeals, which dismissed the
appeal without prejudice. Brady v. State, 222 Md. 442, 160 A.2d 912 (1960). The
appeal was dismissed because case law and the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure
Act barred appellate review of the trial court's ruling on Brady's motion. Id. at 44546, 160 A.2d at 915-16. While forbidding such review, the Act provided that any
convicted person claiming a violation of, for example, the United States Constitution,
could initiate a proceeding at the lowest court level to set aside or correct the sentence.
Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act, Code (1959 Cum. Supp.), art. 27,
§ 645A(a) (as cited in Brady v. State, 222 Md. at 446, 160 A.2d at 915). Brady filed a
petition pursuant to the Act but the court dismissed it. Brady appealed the dismissal,
and the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the suppression of Boblit's
statement denied Brady due process. Brady v. State, 226 Md. 422, 174 A.2d 167
(1961), aff'd, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
29. Brady v. State, 226 Md. at 427, 174 A.2d at 169. Suppression and nondisclosure are synonymous in the context of this note and are used interchangeably
throughout.
30. 226 Md. at 431, 174 A.2d at 172.
31. Brady v. Maryland, 371 U.S. 812 (1962).
32. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963). Justices Black, Harlan, and
White found it unnecessary to reach this due process issue in deciding the case. Id. at
91, 92 n.1 (White, J., concurring; Black, Harlan, J.J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 87 (emphasis added).
34. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675, 676 (1985); United States v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 107 (1976).
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of first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. 35 Thus, Boblit's
statement was material to punishment but not to guilt.
Prosecutorial suppression of material evidence favorable to a defendant 36 violates fifth or fourteenth amendment due process because
it denies the defendant the right to a fair trial. 37 Due process is concerned with preventing unfair trials, not punishing society for prosecutors' misconduct.38 Thus, the good or bad faith of prosecutors in
withholding evidence is irrelevant and new trials are required only
when prosecutors suppress evidence material to defendants. The major issue left unanswered by Brady was how to define materiality for
the purpose of triggering the prosecutor's duty to disclose evidence.
Perhaps because Boblit's inculpatory statement was obviously
favorable to Brady, the Court neither defined materiality 39
nor provided
the quantum of proof necessary to establish materiality.
B.

United States v. Agurs: The First Standard of Materiality

Thirteen years after Brady, the Supreme Court elaborated on the
duty of prosecutorial disclosure in United States v. Agurs 4° by defining
35. Brady.. 373 U.S. at 90.
36. The evidence must be favorable to the defendant for the Brady rule to apply.
Id. at 87. Prosecutors owe no duty to defendants to disclose inculpatory or neutral
evidence. Evidence that is favorable to defendant has been described as evidence that
is "favorable on its face--&, directly exculpatory or mitigating evidence." Note, A
Defendant's Right to Inspect Pretrial Congressional Testimony of Government Witnesses, 80 YALE L.J. 1388, 1400 (1971). Favorable evidence includes evidence relevant to the credibility of witnesses and prior inconsistent statements of government
witnesses. Id. at 1401-02. There is no constitutional difference between exculpatory
and impeachment evidence. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). In
vacating a similar case on other grounds, however, the Supreme Court implied that
evidence which is merely useful to defendant may not be favorable for purposes of the
Brady rule. Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967).
37. The Brady holding was based on fourteenth amendment due process because
Brady was tried in state court. Brady, 373 U.S. at 86. In federal criminal trials, fifth
amendment due process guarantees defendants the right to a fair trial. Agurs, 427
U.S. at 107. Both amendments guarantee the same right to a fair trial so all Supreme
Court cases on prosecutorial disclosure apply equally to state and federal criminal
defendants. Id.
38. "The principle of Mooney v. Holohan [that knowing presentation of perjured
testimony violates due process] [see supra note 23] is not punishment of society for
misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. Society wins
not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of
the administration ofjustice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly." Brady, 373
U.S. at 87.
39. For a discussion of the different standards of materiality applied by lower
courts after Brady, see Comment, Materiality and Defense Requests: Aids in Defining
the Prosecutor'sDuty of Disclosure, 59 IowA L. REv. 433, 447-51 (1973).
40. 427 U.S. 97 (1976). For critiques of United States v. Agurs, see Babcock,
supra note 24, at 1145-55 (the criminal trial as a regulated game); Capra, Access to
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materiality. The Court began its analysis by stating that the Brady
rule arguably applied to three different fact situations and that the
standard of materiality was "not necessarily the same" for each.4 1
First, the Brady rule applies if the prosecutor knew or should have
known that the state's case included perjured testimony.4 2 Second, the
Brady rule applies when the prosecutor possesses exculpatory evidence
unknown to a defendant who makes only a general request or no request at all for evidence. 43 Finally, the rule applies in cases like Brady
where there is a pretrial request for specific evidence that is not disclosed although it exists.44
Writing for seven members of the Court in Agurs, Justice Stevens
clarified Brady by defining materiality as it related to two of the above
fact situations-perjury and general/no requests for evidence. In the
first fact situation, when the prosecutor knew or should have known
that his witness had committed perjury, the Court held that the "reasonable likelihood" standard of materiality applied. 45 The conviction
must be overturned if there is "any reasonable likelihood that the false
testimony could have affected"'46 the verdict. The defendant need not
have requested the evidence that indicated perjury was committed.4 7
This standard of materiality is a broad definition from the defendant's
48
perspective.
The general/no request situation is similar to the facts of Agurs.
Agurs was on trial for murder.4 9 Despite a general request by Agurs'
attorney for all favorable material evidence, the prosecutor did not disclose the victim's criminal record.50 Defense counsel discovered the
criminal record after the trial and moved for a new trial based on the
Exculpatory Evidence: Avoiding the Agurs Problems of ProsecutorialDiscretion and
Retrospective Review, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 391 (1984) (advocating pretrial determination of discoverability by trial court through in camera inspection of the prosecutor's file). The drawbacks of judicial in camera review are discussed in Note, supra
note 36, at 1402 n.67.
41. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106.
42. Id. at 103; see supra note 23.
43. 427 U.S. at 106-07.
44. Id. at 104.
45. Id. at 103.
46. Id. The Court called this a "strict" standard of materiality as viewed from the
prosecutor's perspective. Id. at 104. Conversely, it is a lenient standard from the
defendant's standpoint because he need show only that the incorrect testimony was
reasonably likely to have affected the verdict. This note characterizes the materiality
standards from defendant's perspective.
47. Id. at 103-04.
48. A more detailed treatment of the perjury aspect of due process is beyond the
scope of this note, which focuses instead on the prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense, not the prosecutor's duty to prevent pejury.
49. 427 U.S. at 98.
50. Id. at 100-01.

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:147

prosecutor's nondisclosure.5 1 Agurs contended that the criminal record would have supported her theory of self-defense by showing the
victim's violent character. 52 The Court held that the defendant in a
general/no request situation must show that the evidence meets a
stricter materiality standard than in perjury cases to require disclosure
of evidence.5 3 The Court concluded that the proper standard of materiality was the "reasonable doubt" standard: whether the suppressed
evidence "creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist...
in the context of the entire [trial] record."'5 4 Since the Agurs trial
court had correctly applied this standard, the Court affirmed the trial

court's ruling that the victim's prior criminal record was merely cu55
mulative and did not create a reasonable doubt as to Agurs' guilt.
The Court also addressed the hypothetical situation in which de-

fense counsel does not request any evidence from the prosecutor. The
Court stated that a general request for evidence was the same as making no request at all. 6 Both situations require the same standard of

materiality because neither gives the prosecutor notice of what evi-

dence to disclose.5 7 The prosecutor's duty to disclose arises from the

exculpatory character (if any) of the evidence, not from whether or not
51. A motion for a new trial based on the suppression of evidence is distinguishable from a motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33 based
upon newly discovered evidence. In the case of newly discovered evidence, neither
defendant nor prosecutor have knowledge or possession of the evidence during trial.
The majority and dissent in Agurs agreed that this difference necessitates different
standards of review. Id at 111, 115. In a Rule 33 motion, defendant must prove the
"evidence probably would have resulted in acquittal." Id. at 111 n. 19. When defendant moves for a new trial based on prosecutorial suppression a less burdensome standard applies because of the prosecutor's active distortion of the trial. Id. at 111, 11415. The dissent stated that the majority's standard does not succeed on this point and
that the standard applied actually holds defendant to a higher standard than the majority states it does. Id. at 115-16 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 100.
53. Id. at 106-07.
54. Id. at 112. In its search for the appropriate materiality standard the Court
rejected two standards. First, it rejected the "might have affected the verdict" standard: "The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have
helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish
'materiality' in the constitutional sense." Id. at 109-10. This standard of materiality
was rejected because it would have required the prosecutor to disclose the entire file to
the defense. Id. at 109. Complete disclosure of ifies conflicts with the work product
doctrine. The Court also rejected the standard of whether the prosecutor acted in
good or bad faith, as the Brady Court had, because the goal is to provide fair trials,
not to punish prosecutors. Id. at 110 & n. 17; see supra note 40.
55. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 114.
56. Id at 106-07.
57. Id
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the defense made a request.5 8 Thus, the reasonable doubt standard of
materiality applies to the general/no request situation.5 9
The last fact situation to which the Brady rule might apply consists of a specific request by defense counsel, 60 as in Brady. Brady's
counsel made a pretrial request for specific evidence (any statements
made by the co-defendants), and the prosecutor disclosed all but one
statement made by Brady's co-defendant.6 1 The Agurs Court repeated
the Brady rule, that due process imposes a duty on prosecutors to disclose material evidence in a specific request situation, but the Court
did not clearly indicate whether one of the standards of materiality
promulgated in Agurs applied to specific requests. 62
The Alaska Court of Appeals read Agurs as stating a standard of
materiality for cases in which defense counsel makes a specific request
for evidence, as in Brady.6 3 The Agurs Court stated that "[a] fair analysis of the holding in Brady indicates that implicit in the requirement
of materiality is a concern that the suppressed evidence might have
affected the outcome of the trial." 64 The Alaska Court of Appeals
read Agurs to mean that the more lenient materiality standard that
applies to perjury cases was also to be applied in specific request
cases.6 5 The standard of materiality for perjury is whether there is a
"reasonable likelihood" that the suppressed evidence "could have affected" the verdict or punishment.6 6 This is a less strict standard than
58. Id. at 107.
59. Id. at 112.
60. Id. at 104.
61. Id.
62. Id. In its discussion of the specific request situation, the Court ambiguously
stated that "[a] fair analysis of the holding in Brady indicates that implicit in the
requirement of materiality is a concern that the suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial." Id Consequently, the federal circuit courts of appeal
interpreted this language in a variety of ways. See, ag., United States v. Farid, 733
F.2d 1318, 1321 (8th Cir. 1984) (the reasonable doubt standard applies to specific
requests); United States v. Sperling, 726 F.2d 69, 72 (2d Cir.) (the reasonable likelihood standard applies to specific requests), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1243 (1984); United
States v. Flaherty, 668 F.2d 566, 587 (1st Cir. 1981) (standard is whether "the suppressed evidence 'might have affected the outcome of the trial.' "); United States v.
Weidman, 572 F.2d 1199, 1204 (7th Cir.) (Agurs did not establish a materiality standard for specific requests), cert denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978). See infra notes 71-74 and
accompanying text.
In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), the Court adopted the view of
appellant, the United States Solicitor General, that Agurs did not announce a standard
of materiality for specific requests. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 681 & n.12. See Brief for the
United States, United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (No. 84-48) for the Solicitor General's argument.
63. Maloney v. State, 667 P.2d 1258 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
64. Id. at 1264-65 (citing Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103-05).
65. Id at 1264-65.
66. Id. (citing 427 U.S. at 103).
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that used for general/no requests; therefore, prosecutors have a

greater duty to disclose when perjury or a specific request is in-

volved. 67 Evidence that is material under the perjury standard may
not rise to the requisite level of materiality if the defendant makes a
general/no request. The general/no request standard is whether the
nondisclosed evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist hi the context of the entire trial record. 68 Under this stan-

dard it it less likely that evidence will be deemed material than under
the standard for perjury situations.
C.

United States v. Bagley: The Present Standard of Materiality

In 1985, the United States Supreme Court again addressed the
69
prosecutorial duty to disclose evidence in United States v. Bagley
and resolved the issue that had been left unanswered by both Brady
and Agurs: the standard of materiality for specific request situations.
The ambigtity in Agurs regarding this standard had caused confusion
among the circuit courts of appeal. Several courts determined that the

Agurs Court had set the standard for specific requests as whether "the
67. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
68. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112.
69. 473 U.S. 667 (1985). See supra text accompanying note 64. The plurality
opinion in Bagley states that Agurs "merely explains the meaning of the term 'materiality'." 473 U.S. at 681 n.12. The Agurs opinion did not establish a standard of materiality because it did not "indicate what quantum of likelihood there must be that the
undisclosed evidence would have affected the outcome." Id. Justice Powell did not
participate in the decision and three Justices dissented. Justice Blackmun wrote for
the five-member majority in Parts I and II. Those parts dealt with the issue of
whether nondisclosure of requested impeachment evidence (in the form of an inducement from the state to a witness) denied Bagley due process. Id. at 669-78. In Bagley
v. Lumpkin, 719 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1983), the Ninth Circuit had reversed Bagley's
narcotics conviction because the government's suppression of material evidence violated Bagley's right to confront adverse witnesses. 719 F.2d at 1464. The Supreme
Court reversed this decision and remanded the case for the court of appeals to determine whether there was a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been
different had the inducement been disclosed. 473 U.S. at 684. In Bagley v. Lumpkin,
798 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1986), the Ninth Circuit held that the government's suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial and therefore requires reversal
of the narcotics conviction. 798 F.2d at 1302.
Only Justice O'Connor joined Justice Blackmun in Part III of Bagley. The three
other majority members declined to join in Part III, regarding the specificity of the
defense's request as irrelevant because the materiality standard of reasonable
probability was "sufficiently flexible" to apply to all nondisclosure situations. 473
U.S. at 685. They did, however, agree with the rest of Part III, including the part
which stated that the correct standard of materiality is one of "reasonable
probability." Id. Although Bagley is a persuasive plurality opinion, five Justices
agreed that only one standard of materiality applies to both specific and general/no
requests.
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suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial." 70
Two courts read Agurs as extending the reasonable likelihood standard
to specific requests, 7 1 while another court held that the reasonable
doubt standard applied. 72 Yet another court determined that Agurs

had not established a materiality standard for specific requests at all. 73
The Alaska Court of Appeals read Agurs as holding that the reasonable likelihood standard of perjury cases also applied to specific requests. 74 In Bagley, the Supreme Court held that the proper standard

of materiality for specific requests for evidence is whether there is a
"reasonable probability" that the trial verdict would have been differ-

ent had the evidence been admitted at trial. 75
In Bagley, defense counsel had made a pretrial request for any
evidence of inducements made to prosecution witnesses in exchange

for their testimony. 76 The request was both timely and specific. 77 The
two principal state witnesses had signed contracts with a federal investigative agency which promised them payment for their testimony, but
the prosecutor did not reveal the contracts to the defense counsel.7 8
Five justices agreed that the standard of materiality for general/no
request situations also applies to specific requests. 79 According to the

Agurs decision, the reasonable doubt standard of materiality applied to
general/no requests, but the Bagley Court formulated a new standard
70. United States v. Warhop, 732 F.2d 775, 778 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Montoya, 716 F.2d 1340, 1346 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v. Flaherty, 668 F.2d
566, 587 (1st Cir. 1981); Monroe v. Blackburn, 607 F.2d 148, 151 & n.5 (5th Cir.
1979) (a specific request inquiry is similar to the "reasonable likelihood" standard),
cerl denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980); but see United States v. Goldberg, 582 F.2d 483,
488-89 & n.7 (9th Cir. 1978) (synonymous with the harmless error standard of "reasonable possibility of effect on the verdict;" not the same as the reasonable likelihood
standard), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 973 (1979).
71. United States v. Sperling, 726 F.2d 69, 72 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1243 (1984); Chavis v. North Carolina, 637 F.2d 213, 223 (4th Cir. 1980).
72. United States v. Farid, 733 F.2d 1318, 1321 (8th Cir. 1984).
73. United States v. Weidman, 572 F.2d 1199, 1204 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 821 (1978).
74. Maloney v. State, 667 P.2d 1258, 1264-65 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
75. 473 U.S. at 682. The Court discussed both the "reasonable likelihood" and
the "reasonable probability" standards and found that the "reasonable probability"
standard was "sufficiently flexible" to cover all request cases. Id.
76. Id. at 669-70. For a more detailed statement of the facts of the case, see Casenote, CriminalLaw-Discovety-Nondisclosure Of ProsecutorialEvidence That Can
Be Used For Impeachment Purposes Is Constitutional Error Requiring Reversal If
There Is A ReasonableProbabilityThat The Outcome Of The Trial Is Affected, 17 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 1105, 1105-07 (1986).
77. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 669-70.
78. Id. at 671.
79. Id. at 682, 685. See supra note 69.
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that replaced it. The new standard is whether there is a "reasonable
probability" that the trial verdict would have been different. 80
Part III of the opinion, which was accepted only by Justices
Blackmun and O'Connor, permits the trial court to make an additional inquiry in specific request cases.81 When the defendant's request for evidence is specific, the court should consider, in addition to
the reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different,
any adverse effects the prosecution's withholding may have had on the
defendant's case.8 2 The two justices were concerned that in a specific
request situation the defense is more likely to be misled into believing
that the requested evidence did not exist than in cases of general/no
requests. A majority of the Court, however, did not consider this inquiry necessary. Thus, the only majority holding promulgated by
Bagley is that the new reasonable probability standard of materiality
83
applies to all requests for evidence regardless of their specificity.
D.

"Reasonable Doubt" vs. "Reasonable Probability"

An important issue raised, but unanswered, by Bagley is whether
the reasonable probability standard of materiality is the same as the
reasonable doubt standard for general/no requests under Agurs.8 4 A
comparison of the Court's language describing the materiality standards in Agurs and Bagley reveals different wording. In Agurs, the
standard for general/no requests was whether the evidence withheld
by the prosecutor created a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise
exist, looking at the entire trial record.8 5 The Bagley Court called this
"stricter than the harmless-error standard but more lenient to the defense than the newly-discovered-evidence standard [of Federal Rule of
80. 473 U.S. at 682.
81. Id. at 682-83. For commentary on Part III of the Bagley opinion, see Wyrsch
& Hunt, Specific Requests for Exculpatory Evidence After United States v. Bagley, 55
UMKC L. REv. 50, 56 (1986) (Court failed to make clear how a specific request is
relevant to the reasonable probability standard); Note, Specific Requests and the
ProsecutorialDuty to Disclose Evidence: The Impact of United States v. Bagley, 1986
DUKE L.J. 892 (the additional inquiry in specific request situations is futile.)

82. 473 U.S. at 683. It is unclear whether the inquiry is optional or mandatory,
because Justice Blackmun states both that the trial court "may" and "should" make
the inquiry. Id. at 683. It would seem that the inquiry is optional because only two
justices joined in this part of the opinion.
83. Id. at 685 (White, Burger, and Rehnquist, J.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
84. Bagley reaffirmed the determination inAgurs that the standard for the pejury
situation is that the verdict will be overturned if there is a reasonable likelihood that
the peijury would have affected the verdict. 473 U.S. at 678-80. In other words,
perjured testimony "is considered material unless failure to disclose it would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 680.
85. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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Civil Procedure 33]. " 186 As stated in Bagley, however, the materiality
standard for specific and general/no requests is that "[t]he evidence is
material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different."'8 7 A " 'reasonable probability' is a probability suffi'88
cient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
In Bagley, the plurality states that the Agurs standard had undergone reformulation 89 but does not say whether Bagley's reasonable
probability standard is part of the reformulation. Thus, one must
question whether the reasonable probability standard, which the Bagley Court chose as the correct standard, represents a substantive
change in the standard or a simple rewording. It is unclear whether
the Court considers the Bagley formulation the same as "a reasonable
doubt that did not otherwise exist." Justice Stevens, the author of
Agurs, stated that the standards were the same in his dissent in Bagley.90 If this is true, then Bagley stands for the principle that Agurs'
reasonable doubt standard for general/no requests applies also to specific requests. 9 1
Two facts, however, point to the opposite conclusion-that the
Bagley reasonable probability standard is different from the Agurs reasonable doubt standard. First, the difference in the wording, itself,
supports the argument that the standards are different. The Court
would have little need to rename the standard unless it was also
changing the standard substantively. Second, the standards dictate
different roles for the trial judge. The reasonable doubt test requires
the judge "to make a personal judgment based upon his view of the
total evidentiary picture . . . . A judge may reach this result even
though he believes it probable that not all of the jurors would have
reached the same conclusion."' 92 The majority opinion in Agurs supports this view; the Court reviewed the trial court's ruling using the
correct reasonable doubt standard and found that "in the context of
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

473 U.S. at 681.
Id. at 682.
Id.
Id. at 681.
Id. at 713-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Wyrsch & Hunt, supra note 81, at 56-58. A survey of federal district and

appellate court opinions revealed that the specificity of a request is still regarded as

relevant in determining what effect the evidence would have had on the verdict. Id. at
58. For a model specific request discovery motion, see id. at 66-68.
92. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 23, § 19.5(b), at 758. See United States
v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 116, 117-18 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Cf Babcock, supra
note 25, at 1179 & nn. 173-74 (Agurs did not specify whether the judge was to search
his own mind or the jury's for reasonable doubt, and not surprisingly, both methods
were used by lower courts).
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the entire [trial] record the trial judge remained convinced of respondent's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."9 3 In jury trials, however, the

Bagley reasonable probability standard "does not appear to be tied ex'94
clusively to the judge's own evaluation of the evidentiary picture."
The judge looks to whether there is a reasonable probability that the
jury verdict would have been different, and, when a jury takes a long
time to reach a guilty verdict, a judge could find a reasonable
95
probability in the jurors' minds even if not in his own.
Although Bagley resolved the ambiguity in Agurs over the standard of materiality for specific requests, the new reasonable probability

standard is, itself, ambiguous in its relationship to the Agurs reasonable doubt standard. The Court in Bagley failed to make clear
whether the reasonable probability standard is more favorable to the
defendants than the reasonable doubt standard, or whether the two
standards axe the same. As this discussion indicates, both conclusions
are reasonable.
III.

THE PROSECUTORIAL DUTY TO GATHER AND
PRESERVE EVIDENCE

Before discussing the Alaska cases dealing with materiality standards, it must be noted that these cases may appear out of place in a

note discussing the prosecutorial duty to disclose evidence. In each
case, defendants alleged a violation of the state's duty to gather and

preserve evidence, not a violation of the prosecutors' duty to disclose.
Since 1976, the Alaska Constitution has been interpreted to impose a
duty on the state to gather and preserve certain evidence. 96 The
93. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 114.
94. W. LAFAvE & J.ISRAEL, supra note 23, § 19.5(b), at 58 (Supp. 1987).
95. Id. at 58-59 (Supp. 1987). See Babcock, supra note 25, at 1179. This commentator concludes that the Agurs trial court might very well have determined that
there was a reasonable probability that the jury, had it known about the victim's prior
criminal record indicating a violent nature, would have believed Agurs' self-defense
theory. Id. at 1179-80.
96. Lauderdale v. State, 548 P.2d 376, 382 (Alaska 1976) (state must preserve
ampoules used in breathalyzer test because ampoules were relevant and material to the
preparation of the defense to a driving while intoxicated charge). See also Putnam v.
State, 629 P.2d 35 (Alaska 1980); Torres v. State, 519 P.2d 788 (Alaska 1974). The
test and burden of proof for a claim of failure to preserve evidence was described in
State v. Contreras, 674 P.2d 792 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 718
P.2d 129 (Alaska 1986). The court said that where the prosecutor never possessed the
evidence defendant requests and defendant had the opportunity to preserve it, the
burden is on defendant to show that the prosecutor breached his duty of preserving
the evidence. Id. at 821. See also Gudjonnson v. State, 667 P.2d 1254 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1983); Bradley v. State, 662 P.2d 993 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
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United States Supreme Court had suggested that such a duty also existed under the United States Constitution but did not squarely address the issue until 1984, when it analyzed the duty and its limitations
in California v. Trombetta.97 The duty of disclosure is related to and
dependent upon the duty to gather and preserve evidence. 98 Although
the duty to preserve and gather evidence is different from the duty to
disclose evidence, 99 the Alaska courts treat them the same in terms of
materiality standards. For example, in the subsequently decided cases
of Maloney v. State and Kwallek v. State, the court looked to Brady
and Agurs for the appropriate materiality standard, even though both
defendants appealed on the grounds of prosecutorial failure to gather
and preserve evidence.
In Californiav. Trombetta, the United States Supreme Court held
that any duty that fourteenth amendment due process imposed on the
states to gather and preserve evidence was subject to certain limits. 100
In discussing the limitations on the duty, the Court speaks from the
premise that such a duty exists in certain cases. In Trombetta, the
Court held that the Brady-Agurs materiality standard did not apply to
the duty to gather and preserve evidence, but that prosecutors are
obliged to preserve evidence only if the evidence has "an exculpatory
value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and [is] of
such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means."' 0 1 One would have
expected the Alaska courts to apply Trombetta to appeals alleging
grounds of violations of the duty to gather and preserve evidence
under the United States Constitution. To date, however, Alaska
courts have not analyzed any failure-to-gather-and-preserve cases
under the Trombetta materiality standard. 0 2
97. 467 U.S. 479 (1984). Evidence in this case was not such that would have
played a role in the suspect's defense and thus did not give rise to the duties. More
recently, the Court affirmed the existence of a duty to preserve in Arizona v. Youngblood, -

U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 333 (1988).

98. A duty to gather and preserve any reasonably apparent material evidence that
might play a significant role in the suspect's defense is necessary to give the prosecutor's duty to disclose any meaning. Absent the duty to gather and preserve, the state
could easily circumvent the duty to disclose by destroying, intentionally losing, or not
gathering material evidence favorable to defendants.
99. The duty to gather and preserve evidence applies to state and local investigative personnel, while the duty to disclose evidence involves prosecutors. This clear-cut
line is often blurred because the prosecutors and investigators work so closely together. See, eg., State v. Kwallek, No. 883, slip. op. (Alaska Ct. App. July 24, 1985)
(per curiam).
100. 467 U.S. at 488.
101. Id. at 489.
102. The Alaska Court of Appeals cited Trombetta v. California in Kwallek v.
State, No. 883, slip op. (Alaska Ct. App. July 24, 1985) (per curiam), but not as
controlling precedent. The court also cited Trombetta in Best v. Municipality of
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It is unclear from Alaska opinions why the courts continue to
apply the standards of materiality from Agurs and Bagley (instead of
Trombetta) to cases involving the state's failure to gather and preserve
evidence. Kwallek is a failure-to-gather-and-preserve case decided after Trombetta, yet the court applied the Agurs standard of materiality
instead of Trombetta. The Alaska courts are free to incorporate these
materiality standards into the test for materiality under the Alaska
Constitution. This note focuses on the standards of materiality used
by the Alaska courts and does not explore why the Alaska courts have
ignored Trombetta. In the following discussion of Maloney and Kwallek therefore, this note assumes that for purposes of due process
claims under the Alaska Constitution the two types of cases are
identical.
IV.

MATERIALITY STANDARDS UNDER THE ALASKA
CONSTITUTION

At the same time that the United States Supreme Court was developing the prosecutorial duty to disclose, the Alaska Court of Ap-

peals was interpreting the Court's decisions, as well as developing the
disclosure duty under the Alaska Constitution. Alaska courts took a
more pro-defendant view of the disclosure duty than did the Supreme
Court. 103 In Maloney v. State,0 4 decided before both Bagley and
Anchorage, 712 P.2d 892 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). The court declined to overrule or
even reconsider Lauderdale v. State, which held that the police must preserve breath
samples from breathalyzers. 712 P.2d at 894. The court correctly stated that because
Lauderdale was based on state due process grounds, it stood despite Trombetta because Trombetta was decided on fourteenth amendment grounds. Id. See Trombetta,
467 U.S. at 491 n.12 ("State courts and legislatures, of course, remain free to adopt
more rigorous safeguards governing the admissibility of scientific evidence than those
imposed by the Federal Constitution. See, eg., Lauderdale v. State, 548 P.2d 376
(Alaska 1976).").
The Alaska Supreme Court cited Trombetta in Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156
(Alaska 1985). The issue was whether the police were required by due process to
record the custodial interrogation of criminal suspects. The court held that the fourteenth amendment did not so require pursuant to Trombetta, but that state due process did. 711 P.2d at 1160. Reiterating what the United States Supreme Court stated
in Trombetta, -the court stated, "as we have done on previous occasions, we construe
Alaska's constitutional provisions, in this instance, as affording rights beyond those
guaranteed by the United States Constitution." Id.
It is yet to be seen whether the recent United States Supreme Court decision in
Arizona v. Youngblood, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 333 (1988) will similarly be ignored by
the Alaska courts. Youngblood, like Trombetta, is concerned with a federal due process claim; therefore, it will likely be ignored.
103. The due process rights articulated by the United States Supreme Court are the
minimum requirements under the federal Constitution. The states are free to expand,
but not contract, principles of due process provided by their own constitutions. As
Trombetta pointed out, from 1976 to 1985, UnitedStates v. Agurs and its predecessors
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Trombetta, the Alaska Court of Appeals determined that Agurs applied the more lenient reasonable likelihood materiality standard in
cases of specific requests. 10 5 Based on this assumption, the court developed precedent interpreting the duty to disclose under the United
States Constitution and decided that, with a mitigating modification, 10 6 the same materiality standard would apply under the Alaska
Constitution. 10 7 In 1985, however, the United States Supreme Court
decided in Bagley that the reasonable likelihood standard did not apply to specific requests, but that reasonable probability would be the
standard for all specific and general/no requests.10 8
Since Trombetta and Bagley, no Alaska court has explicitly overruled the previous interpretaton of federal precedent. Alaska courts
will eventually have to acknowledge that the standard they are applying to claims under the United States Constitution must comport with
the Supreme Court's holdings. The question then remains as to how
strictly Alaska courts will interpret the Bagley reasonable probability
standard as compared to the reasonable likelihood standard. Answering this question requires an examination of Alaska cases.
A. Maloney v. State: Alaska Constitution Mitigates Harshness of
the Reasonable Doubt Materiality Standard
In Maloney v. State,10 9 defendant Maloney made a specific but
untimely request for evidence. The court considered this request
equivalent to a general/no request and therefore applied the reasonable doubt standard. 110 This standard is defined as whether the evidence would have created a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise
exist. "' The court, however, mitigated the harshness of this standard
by holding that the Alaska Constitution requires an additional inquiry
into whether the2 defense had a reasonable explanation for the lateness
of the request."
defined the minimum duty that due process imposed upon prosecutors to disclose
evidence in their possession to defendants. 467 U.S. at 489.
104. 667 P.2d 1258 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
105. Id. at 1264-65.
106. Id. at 1266 n.7; Kwallek v. State, No. 883, slip op. at 6 (Alaska Ct. App. July
24, 1985) (Echoing the Maloney court's focus on the defendant's failure to make a
timely request, the Kwallek court also reasoned that in such cases the accused bears
the burden of establishing that the evidence would have been exculpatory and would
have raised a reasonable doubt.) (per curiam).
107. Maloney, 667 P.2d at 1265-66.
108. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
109. 667 P.2d 1258 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
110. Id. at 1265.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1266 n.7.
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Maloney had been convicted of second-degree murder.11 3 He had
beaten his girlfriend in their apartment, cleaned up some of the ensuing mess, and spent the rest of the night drinking with friends at a
local bar.1 14 When he returned to the apartment the girlfriend was
dead.1 1 5 Doctors determined she had been alive for two hours after
the fatal assault.1 1 6 Maloney maintained that after he had left the
117
apartment an intruder inflicted the fatal puncture wounds.
Just before the closing argument, defense counsel requested production of several pieces of evidence, including hair found in the apartment wastebasket, an electric fan, and the shard broken off the fan
that may have served as the murder weapon. 118 Defense counsel also
requested the results of any tests performed on the decedent's
hands. 119 The prosecution could not honor the request because the
items either had not been gathered or had been lost before trial, and
20
because no tests had been performed on the decedent's hands.'
Maloney appealed his conviction on the ground that the police's
failure to gather and preserve this evidence violated his right to a fair
trial' 2 ' guaranteed by due process under both the United States and
the Alaska Constitutions. 2 2 The court of appeals affirmed the
23
conviction. 1
In response to Maloney's appeal on federal constitutional
grounds, the Alaska Court of Appeals interpreted Agurs as requiring
that the reasonable likelihood standard applicable to peijury cases be
applied to the specific request situation.1 24 The court determined that
defense counsel's request, coming as it did just before closing argument, was untimely. 125 Thus, although the request was very specific,
the court found that its untimeliness rendered it more analogous to the
general/no request situation. 12 6 Under the reasonable doubt standard,
113. Id. at 1260.
114. Id. at 1259-61.
115. Id. at 1260.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1260-61.
118. Id. at 1263-64.
119. Id. at 1263.
120. Id.
121. Id. Maloney also claimed that the state's failure to preserve evidence violated
his right to confront and cross-examine the state's witnesses. The court did not reach
the merits on these issues because they had not been properly preserved for appeal.
Id. at 1267.
122. U.S. CONST. amend. V; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 7.
123. Maloney, 667 P.2d at 1259.
124. Id. at 1264-65.
125. Id. at 1265.
126. Id. The court seems to have extended the Supreme Court's reasoning that a
general request is the same as no request to mean that an untimely request, even if
specific, is the same as no request.
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Maloney had the burden of proving that the undisclosed evidence,
when considered in light of all the evidence presented at trial, created
a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.1 2 7 The court of appeals affirmed the
trial court's ruling that the presentation of this evidence
to the jury
128
would not have produced a verdict of not guilty.
Responding to Maloney's due process appeal under the state constitution, the court of appeals applied a slightly different analysis but
reached the same result. In delineating the due process requirements
of the Alaska Constitution, however, the court made an additional inquiry, which was not required by Agurs for the United States Constitution. Before deciding to apply the stricter reasonable doubt standard
rather than the reasonable likelihood standard, the Alaska court inquired whether defense counsel had a reasonable explanation for the
lateness of the request.1 29 In this case, the court held that Maloney
had no excuse because counsel could have made the same request
before trial.1 30 The court noted that if Maloney had exercised his right
to pretrial examination of available evidence, 13 he would have learned
before the trial what evidence had been
tested and what evidence
32
tested.'
independently
been
have
should
127. Id. at 1265-66.
128. Id. at 1266-67.
129. Id. at 1266 & n.8.
130. Id.
131. Rule 16 of the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for mutual discovery of available evidence and sanctions for noncompliance. Section (b)(1) lists the
evidence which, if it is in the possession or control of the prosecutor, his staff or investigators, must be disclosed to defendant. ALASKA R. CRM. P. 16(b)(1). This includes
the names, addresses, and statements of defendants, co-defendants, persons with
knowledge of relevant facts, and experts. Id. Prosecutors must also disclose experts'
reports, defendant's property which will be used in court, and lists of prior criminal
convictions of all witnesses. Id. The prosecutor must disclose information provided
by informants and electronic surveillance. ALASKA R. CRiM. P. 16(b)(2). Information not included within this list must be disclosed if it tends to negate defendant's
guilt or reduce punishment. ALASKA R. CRlM. P. 16(b)(3). The rule states that in
these instances the prosecutor "shall disclose" the evidence, apparently not requiring
defendant to make a request. The only sections which require defendant to make a
request provide for discretionary disclosure of discoverable evidence not in the prosecutor's control upon a showing of materiality to the court. ALASKA R. CRIM. P.
16(b)(5-7).
Sections (c)(4) and (c)(5) specify the information the court may order the defense
to disclose to the prosecutor. ALASKA R. CRiM. P. 16(c)(4), (5). Also, the rule imposes a continuing duty to disclose on both parties. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2).
The court has the power to remedy parties' failure to comply with its orders or the
rules, and to sanction counsel if the violation is willful. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(e)(1),
(2).
132. Maloney, 667 P.2d at 1265.
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This additional inquiry serves two purposes. 133 First, there are
situations in which a timely request is impossible because defense
counsel could not resonably have been expected to be aware that the
favorable evidence even existed. 134 The court was particularly concerned that under Agurs the defense could be the victim of bad faith
destruction of evidence by the state and still be "punished" for an untimely request by the application of the stricter standard. 13 5 An inquiry into counsel's reason for the late request would prevent this
unfair result. The second purpose of the inquiry is to prevent defense
counsel from purposefully delaying requests for evidence in order to
create an appealable issue. 136 The court apparently believed that the
additional inquiry into the reason for the late request would strike a
balance between unfairness to defendants caused by prosecutorial bad
faith and the potential for abuse of the mechanism if defendants were
encouraged to make unjustifiably late requests for evidence.
Maloney v. State indicates a concern, also expressed in the Agurs
dissent, 137 for the harshness of the reasonable doubt standard. The
Maloney court stated that it was not deciding whether the reasonable
doubt standard should be applied to all untimely request cases because
a blanket application would be unduly harsh.13 8 Acting on this concern, the court inquired whether the untimeliness of defense counsel's
request was excused on the grounds that it was caused by events beyond counsel's control.1 39 Because the court determined that there
was no reason Maloney should not have known that the state possessed the evidence wanted for independent testing, 140 the court applied the reasonable doubt standard.' 4 ' Presumably, however, had
Maloney shown a justifiable excuse, the court would have applied the
133. The Alaska Supreme Court has not explicity ruled on the propriety of the
additional inquiry. In Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 130 n.1 (Alaska 1986), the
Alaska Supreme Court approved the result of the appellate court's analysis in State v.
Contreras, 674 P.2d 792 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983), which included asking whether defendant's request for evidence was timely.
134. Maloney, 667 P.2d at 1265 n.7.
135. Id.

136. Id. at 1266 n.9.
137. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 115-16 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
138. Maloney, 667 P.2d at 1265 n.7.
139. Id. at 1266.
140. "Under Alaska's broad rules of criminal discovery, Maloney had the right to
pretrial examination of the state's photographs, of all other physical evidence in the
possession of the state, and of all police and expert witness reports concerning such
evidence. See ALAsKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(v).... He should have been able to
determine what evidence had been tested, and he should have been capable of requesting that specilic evidence be made available for his own independent testing." Id. at
1265. See supra note 133.
141. Id. at 1265-66.
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less strict reasonable likelihood standard of materiality for specific

requests. 142
B. Kwallek v. State
In Kwallek v. State,143 the Alaska Court of Appeals applied the
test for due process under the Alaska Constitution that it had expounded in Maloney. Although Kwallek was decided one year after
Trombetta and twenty-two days after Bagley, the court mentioned
only Trombetta and continued to analyze the federal standard as it
had in Maloney. The court reaffirmed the requirement for the additional inquiry into the reasonableness of the untimely request. Since
the late request was reasonably justified, the court declined to apply
the more stringent reasonable doubt standard. 144 By negative implication, then, the court determined that the applicable standard for materiality in these circumstances would be that used in specific requests:
whether there was a reasonable likelihood that the verdict would have
been affected.145 If, however, the untimely request was inexcusable,
the stricter standard applicable to general/no request situations would
apply. That is, the verdict would be overturned only if the evidence
46
would have created a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.'
Kwallek had appealed her conviction for first-degree murder on
the ground that the state's failure to gather and preserve evidence denied her due process under the federal and state constitutions. 47 The
police did not preserve fingerprints on the murder weapon although it
was possible to have done so.' 4 8 Defense counsel did not request any
fingerprints until after the start of the trial.149 The court excused the
untimely request because it found that the state had inexcusably
delayed performing ballistics tests on the weapon, thus preventing the
defense from learning any details of fingerprints on the gun. 15 0 Therefore, implicitly adopting the reasonable likelihood standard of materiality pursuant to Agurs, the court found no denial of due process
142. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
143. No. 883, slip op. (Alaska Ct. App. July 24, 1985) (per curiam). This case was
decided 22 days after the Supreme Court handed down its decision in UnitedStates v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). Kwallek does not state why Bagley is not controlling;

indeed, it does not mention the case.
144. Kwallek, slip op. at 8 n.7.

145. Id. at 6 & n.6.
146. Id. at 2n.1.
147. Id. at 8-9.
148. Id. at 8 n.7.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 8-9. The outcome of the case did not turn on the due process question,
however. The court ultimately found that Kwallek never demonstrated that the police
actually destroyed a usable fingerprint. Id. at 10.
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because the fingerprints would have been unlikely to result in a different verdict.151 Kwallek had often handled the weapon and lent it to
other persons, so the presence of her prints and those of others would
not have been surprising.
As required by Maloney, 152 however, the Kwallek court applied
the stricter reasonable doubt standard of materiality to Kwallek's request for a bloody palm print found at the scene of the crime. 153 Defense counsel did not request the print until after the trial had started
and gave no explanation for the delay.15 4 The court held the untimely
request inexcusable and consequently, under the stricter standard of
materiality, found that the palm print would not have created a reasonable doubt.1 55
The reasoning in Maloney and Kwallek is based partly on the
Alaska court's resolution of the ambiguity left by Agurs about whether
the Supreme Court had stated a standard of materiality for specific
requests. The Alaska Court of Appeals read Agurs to mean that the
reasonable doubt standard of materiality applied to general/no requests and that the less strict reasonable likelihood standard applied to
specific requests. Based on this interpretation of the requirements of
the United States Constitution, the court created an additional due
process test under the Alaska Constititution. The court perceived the
reasonable doubt standard as too strict when the defendant's specific
request was untimely for reasons beyond his or her control. Thus,
when faced with an untimely specific request, the court would apply
the less strict reasonable likelihood standard if the defense gave a reasonable explanation for its untimeliness.
Since this additional inquiry is required only by the Alaska Constitution, the court would use it only upon hearing an appeal for denial
of state constitutional due process. An appeal based on the United
States Constitution would not receive this extra consideration. Since
the reasonable likelihood standard of materiality is less strict than the
reasonable doubt standard, using the former instead of the latter
would mean that prosecutors have a greater obligation to disclose the
evidence they possess or control. Therefore, the court of appeals established that the Alaska Constitution imposes a greater duty of disclosure on prosecutors than does the United States Constitution.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. al. 8-9.
See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
Kwallek slip op. at 6 & n.6.
Id.
Id. at 6-7 & n.6.
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V.

THE IMPACT OF BAGLEY ON THE ALASKA MATERIALITY

STANDARD FOR SPECIFIC REQUESTS

The United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Bagley had a threefold impact on Maloney. First, Bagley showed that
Maloney, insofar as it purported to interpret the materiality standard
for specific requests required by Agurs, was wrong. 156 Second, Maloney held that the materiality standard for specific requests was not the
same as the standard for general/no requests. 157 Bagley held that one
standard of materiality applies to both specific requests and general/
no requests. 158 Third, Maloney held that the materiality standard for
specific requests was less strict than the reasonable doubt standard applied to general/no requests.1 5 9 The Bagley opinion states that Agurs
had "suggested" that specific requests triggered a less strict standard
of materiality than general/no requests.1 60 The Court abandoned this
suggestion in Bagley in favor of a uniform standard.1 61 Two members
of the Court wanted to treat specific requests more favorably, so they
instructed the trial court to inquire into adverse effects that the prosecutor's failure to fulfill the specific request might have on the

defense. 162
In Maloney and Kwallek, the Alaska Court of Appeals was concerned with the specificity and timeliness of defendants' requests.
Since the Alaska court understood that the United States Constitution
requires the same higher standard of materiality for general/no requests and untimely specific requests, the court determined it would be
unfair to apply this higher standard to a specific request that was untimely for reasons beyond the defendant's control. Now that the
United States Supreme Court, in Bagley, has decided that the same
reasonable probability standard applies to specific requests and general/no requests, it remains to be seen whether Alaska courts will continue to consider the specificity and timeliness of a request when
hearing due process claims under the Alaska Constitution. In other
words, the question arises as to whether Alaska courts will treat specific, timely requests more favorably than general/no requests under
the Alaska Constitution.
The answer to that question depends on how stringent the Alaska
courts perceive the Bagley standard of materiality to be. If they view
the reasonable probability standard of materiality as identical to the
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
Maloney, 667 P.2d 1258, 1264-65 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
473 U.S. at 682.
667 P.2d at 1265.
473 U.S. at 681. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
473 U.S. at 682-83.
Id. at 681-84.
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reasonable doubt standard (formerly applicable to general/no request
situations), this stricter reasonable doubt standard would, in the
courts' eyes, govern both specific and general/no request situations.
In that event, the Alaska Court of Appeal's concern voiced in Maloney 163 still exists: that the reasonable doubt standard is too harsh
when the defendant's specific request is untimely through no fault of
counsel. Implicit in this concern is that the reasonable doubt standard
is also too harsh for timely, specific requests, although the court never
stated why this is so. It may be that the court was concerned that, as
Justices Blackmun and O'Connor recognized in Bagley, nondisclosure
upon a specific request is more likely to mislead the defense into believing that the requested evidence does not exist than in cases of general/no requests. 16 One would expect the Alaska courts, on state
constitutional grounds, to apply a more lenient standard to timely specific requests and untimely requests that are justifiable.
In order to afford defendants sufficient protection, Alaska courts
might choose to retain the analysis set forth in Maloney as the standard under the Alaska Constitution. Thus, the more lenient reasonable likelihood standard would apply to specific requests under the
Alaska Constitution. If the court of appeals perceives the United
States Constitution as requiring a stronger showing than reasonable
likelihood to meet the reasonable probability standard, then the
Alaska Constitution would provide more protection to defendants
who make timely specific requests for evidence or whose untimely requests can be reasonably excused. An alternative to Maloney would be
to adopt Justice Blackmun's suggestion that courts consider any adverse effects that nondisclosure after a specific request would have on
65
the defense.1
In order to evaluate whether Alaska courts will continue to treat
specific, timely requests for evidence more favorably than general/no
requests, one must also consider the other possible interpretation of
Bagley. The Alaska courts might not perceive the reasonable
probability standard to be similar to the reasonable doubt standard. If
Alaska courts perceive the Bagley reasonable probability standard to
be less strict than the reasonable doubt standard and more akin to the
reasonable likelihood standard, then the reasonable probability standard might not be perceived as too harsh for defendants whose specific
163. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
164. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
165. One commentator has concluded that the additional inquiry in cases of specific requests fails on two grounds. Note, Specific Requests and the ProsecutorialDuty
to Disclose Evidence: The Impact of United States v. Bagley, 1986 DUKE L.J. 892.
First, adverse effects are just as likely to occur after a general request as after a specific
request. Id. at 913. Second, the inquiry does not assist the defense in proving materiality. Id.
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requests are timely or excusably late. The Maloney court was also
concerned that a lenient standard for untimely requests would give
defendants an incentive to postpone requests so as to create an issue
for appeal. If the Alaska courts remain troubled by this possibility
they could develop a harsher materiality standard for requests that are
inexcusably late, thereby deterring such requests.
It appears that the Alaska Court of Appeals perceives the reasonable probability standard as more like reasonable likelihood than reasonable doubt. The court recently applied the reasonable probability
standard in a specific request case. In St. John v. State, 166 defendant
St. John was injured in a car accident and taken to the hospital where,
in the regular course of treatment, a blood sample was taken from him
and tested for alcohol. 167 At trial, the prosecutor presented the positive result of the test, and
St. John was convicted of manslaughter and
168
second-degree assault.
On appeal, St. John argued that the state's failure to procure and
preserve his blood sample taken by the hospital denied him due process under the Alaska and United States Constitutions.1 69 Even
though the case involved a failure to preserve evidence and the
Trombetta materiality standard should have been applied, the court
applied Bagley's reasonable probability standard 170 and found no de1 71
nial of federal due process.
For purposes of the state due process claim, the court stated that
the reasonable probability standard was similarto that of the materiality standard under the Alaska Constitution.1 72 The state standard is
whether the evidence "would probably have affected the outcome" of
the trial.1 73 The court described this standard as "essentially one of
harmless error." 174 While the reasonable probability standard may be
similar to the harmless error standard, the United States Supreme
Court has never described it as such, and the Court expressly rejected
the harmless error standard in favor of a stricter one in Agurs. 175 The
Supreme Court has described the standard for perjury cases as one of
harmless error: "[T]he fact that testimony is perjured is considered
166. 715 P.2d 1205 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
167. Id.at 1211.
168. Id. at 1207, 1211.
169. Id.at 1211.
170. Id. at 1212. The court actually seemed to collapse the concerns of preservation of evidence with those of disclosure in its application of the Bagley reasonable
probability standard.
171. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial on other grounds. St. John,
715 P.2d at 1213.
172. Id. at 1212.
173. Id.
174. Id. (citing Carman v. State, 604 P.2d 1076, 1080-81 (Alaska 1979)).

175. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108-09 (1976).
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material unless failure to disclose it would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 176 Only two dissenting Justices in Agurs and Bagley
have argued that this standard should be adopted for all disclosure
situations. 177 Given the Court's repeated rejection of the harmless error standard, it seems unlikely that it would describe the reasonable
probability standard as similar to harmless error.
If St. John is the harbinger of future Alaska court decisions, then,
under the Alaska Constitution, the least strict reasonable likelihood
standard, under the guise of the reasonable probability standard, will
apply to specific requests. It is unclear whether this standard will also
be applied to general/no requests under the Alaska Constitution. The
Alaska courts would be required to abandon their less favorable treatment of general/no requests and adopt the Supreme Court's view that
specificity is, not a basis for distinguishing between requests. Arguably, the Alaska courts could adopt the reasonable probability standard
for all requests and make the additional inquiry described in Bagley
when the defendant makes a specific request. Doing so would make
the materiality standard more favorable to defendants than it was
before.
Assuming that the Alaska courts continue to treat general/no requests less favorably than specific requests, there remain the issues of
what materiality standard should apply to general/no requests and
whether the untimeliness of a specific request should result in its being
treated as a general/no request. Although the reasonable probability
standard, applied to specific requests, resolves Maloney's concern that
the reasonable doubt standard was too harsh for defendants, it does
not solve the court's other concern. The court made this distinction
based on timeliness to deter defendants from creating an appealable
issue by requesting evidence after the start of trial. Therefore, it is
quite possible that Alaska courts will impose a harsher standard than
reasonable probability on defendants whose requests are unjustifiably
late.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The analysis of the development of the prosecutorial duty to disclose under the United States and Alaska Constitutions indicates that
the Alaska courts must take three actions. First, they must apply the
standard announced in Trombetta to claims of failure to gather and
preserve evidence under the United States Constitution. As the
Supreme Court stated in that case, states are free to adopt more liberal
176. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 680 (1985).
177. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 114-22 (Marshall and Brennan, J.J., dissenting); Bagley,
473 U.S. at 691-709 (Marshall and Brennan, J.J., dissenting). See Casenote, supra
note 76.
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standards under their state constitutions. Second, Alaska courts
should review the assertion in St. John that the reasonable probability
standard is quite similar to the harmless error standard. In light of the
Supreme Court's statements about the harmless error standard, the
reasonable probability standard is more stringent than St. John suggests. Thus, Alaska courts should construe reasonable probability
more strictly than in St. John when addressing federal constitutional
claims.
Finally, the courts must decide whether the reasonable
probability standard will apply to general/no requests under the
Alaska Constitution. St. John applied this standard to a timely, specific request. Under the United States Constitution, this standard
should apply to all requests. Alaska courts, however, have yet to decide whether, under the Alaska Constitution, they will apply a uniform standard that disregards the specificity of requests, or a higher
standard than reasonable probability for general/no requests. If the
courts choose to continue to apply different materiality standards
based on the specificity of the request, they must also decide whether
untimely, specific requests will be treated as general/no requests absent any justification. The decision should be made only after considering the concerns raised by the Alaska Court of Appeals in Maloney.
One concern was that the reasonable doubt standard of materiality
was too harsh for defendants with specific requests. Since Bagley replaced that standard with the reasonable probability standard, which
the court of appeals has interpreted favorably to defendants, this is no
longer a viable concern. The other concern was that it seemed unfair
to apply the harsher materiality standard to specific requests that were
untimely for reasons beyond defendant's control. Defense counsel
could not be expected to make a timely, specific request when unaware
that the discoverable evidence even existed. Distinguishing between
timely and untimely specific requests also serves a deterrent function
by discouraging defense counsel from intentionally delaying requests
for evidence until trial in order to preserve an issue for appeal. Obviously, at least two materiality standards are required to address these
concerns of deterrence and fairness.
If the Alaska courts agree that these two concerns are legitimate,
then one can expect to see the courts apply a stricter standard to general/no requests and inexcusably late specific requests. In these cases,
defendants would not appeal on state constitutional grounds but
rather on federal constitutional grounds to avail themselves of the reasonable probability standard while escaping the harsher state standard. This preference for the federal constitution did not exist before
Bagley, when defendants preferred state constitutional claims because
of the advantages afforded by Maloney. If the courts, however, do not

174
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perceive these concerns as important enough to warrant a stricter materiality stndard, one can expect the courts to apply the reasonable
probability standard to all requests. In that case, appellate review of
failure to disclose claims would be the same under the United States
and Alaska Constitutions, and defendants would have no advantage or
disadvantage in framing their claim under the Alaska Constitution.
Whichever course the Alaska courts take, it will no longer be advantageous for defendants to make their claim under the Alaska
Constitution.

